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STATE OF UTAH 
T I T A N I U M M E T A L S CORPORA-
TION O F AMERICA, a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SPACE M E T A L S , INC., a Corpora-
tion and V A L L E Y BANK A N D 
T R U S T COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
A P P E L L A N T ' S 
P E T I T I O N F O R R E H E A R I N G 
I - P E T I T I O N F O R R E H E A R I N G 
Petitioners respectively move this Court for an 
Order vacating its decision of December 13, 1974; and 
move the Court to enter a decision which is based on 
the facts of this case, rather than assumed facts, and 
the applicable law, as it is reasonably applied. 
Case No. 
13474 
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I I - I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Neither the facts set forth in the Court's opinion, 
nor the law upon which the opinion is based are correctly 
stated. In the Supreme Court's opinion, matters which 
are not supported by the record in this case are stated 
as if they were facts, and law is applied which does not 
support the Court's holding. 
I l l - T H E COURT B A S E D I T S 
F I N D I N G S U P O N F A C T S W H I C H 
A R E I N C O R R E C T L Y S T A T E D 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court states, "The 
Bank honored by cashiers checks payable to Titanium, 
a good number and all of the invoices sent to it, cover-
ing goods shipped to Space Metals, as it had honored 
letter I, noting thereon that Space Metals was pur-
chaser. . ." This statement is completely falacious and 
is not backed up by any evidence in the record. The 
Bank did not honor all the invoices sent to it. The Bank 
did not note on all of its cashiers checks that Space 
Metals was purchaser. These two statements of the 
facts were clearly relied upon by the Court in making 
its determination. 
Further, at no time was an "original" invoice re-
ceived by the Bank as stated in the opinion. 
Further, the Bank did not "issue its customary 
cashiers checks payable to Titanium". To the contrary, 
Space Metals "purchased" the checks, named the payee 
and directed the disposition thereof. This was never 
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the Bank's act or the Bank's credit; but the act and 
credit of Space Metals. 
Further, there is no evidence that any payments 
on the 2nd or 3rd letters of credit were "paid before 
due date by the Bank," as stated in the opinion! This 
is a false and misleading statement of the evidence. 
The evidence is clear and uncontradicted that 
1. The Bank made the payments under 
letter # 1 on invoices as required. There is no 
evidence that Space Metals was indicated as 
"purchaser" on these payments. 
2. No payments were ever made by the 
Bank under the 2nd and 3rd letters of credit, 
but to the contrary, each payment was pur-
chased by Space Metals Inc. and each payment 
so indicated. 
The importance of a clear understanding of the 
critical facts in this case is essential. The Supreme 
Court's opinion manifests no such clear understanding 
of the facts, and for this reason it is obvious that the 
decision should be reconsidered, vacated or amended. 
IV - T H E COURT E R R E D I N H O L D I N G 
FOR T H E R E S P O N D E N T B A S E D U P O N 
A T H E O R Y OF CONTRACT, S INCE E V E N 
U N D E R A CONTRACT T H E O R Y T H E 
J U D G M E N T CANNOT BE S U S T A I N E D 
The Supreme Court, in its opinion, has correctly 
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narrowed down the issues involved in this case. The 
Court states that its conclusion is based upon a con-
tract theory and eliminates the question of waiver. The 
Court's decision must then turn on whether or not there 
is evidence that the terms of the contract were met. To 
make a determination with regard to this, one must 
first ask what were the essential terms of the contract. 
The essential terms of the contract in this case were 
laid out in the letter of credit. The third letter of credit 
clearly and unequivocally stated that Valley Bank's 
obligation was to arise only upon presentation of col-
lection drafts. Valley Bank did not agree to make any 
payments upon presentation of invoices. The terms of 
the contract, as established in the letter of credit, were 
clear. 
I t seems strange that the Court underlines pre-
catory language in the letters of credit, which language 
describes the customer's account rather than the con-
tract terms. The Court has obviously confused descrip-
tive language with contract conditions. We realize that 
if "wishes were horses, beggers would ride" but the Bank 
respectfully objects to the Court substituting its wishes 
for contract terms and facts to the Bank's detriment 
in the amount of $55,284.38. 
Thus, even under a theory of contract, Valley 
Bank and Trust Company should prevail. Once a de-
termination is made that contract law applies to a given 
situation, the Court cannot stop there. The next step, 
is to then determine what contractual obligations are 
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involved. Here, the contractual obligations involved 
were clearly set forth in the third letter of credit. They 
were never met. 
V - T H E COURT E R R E D I N B A S I N G I T S 
D E C I S I O N U P O N P R I N C I P A L S OF L A W 
W H I C H A R E NOT D I R E C T L Y A P P L I C A B L E 
On Page three of its Opinion, the Supreme Court 
states, "We suggest that the pleading does not bottom 
this case on any theory of waiver. I t is based on a 
theory ex contractu, and the evidence supports such 
theory." I t is clear from this statement and other state-
ments in the opinion, that the Court is basing its de-
cision upon principals of general contract law, as dis-
cussed in the previous point, instead of upon the more 
clearly applicable UCC law in the area of letters of 
credit. What is involved in this case is not a simple 
contract, but rather a letter of credit, the legal inter-
pretation of which is governed by the UCC. I t is for 
this reason, that principals of general contract law were 
not mentioned by Respondent, Appellant, or the lower 
Court. I t was assumed, and properly so, that the law 
that governs in this case, is the law that specifically 
relates to letters of credit. The law, as laid out in "Uni-
form laws Annotated" a West Publishing Company 
consolidation of the various Uniform Commercial Codes, 
IT HI i in 11 r Mini ii T L L J J L X L I I J ^ 
clearly states, "generally - the essential requirements of 
the letters of credit must be strictly complied with", 
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Section 5-105 Note 1; Section 5-103 Note 1. This prin-
ciple is also set forth in 50 Am Jur 2nd, Letters of 
Credit, and Credit Cards, Section 21, which is cited by 
Judge Ellett in his dissent. 
There was not strict compliance with the terms of 
the letter of credit. The essential term of the third 
letter of credit was presentation to Valley Bank of 
drafts. This term was never complied with, and thus, 
Valley Bank's obligation to pay never arose. 
The Opinion by the Court states that, 
". . . the language of the letters supplemented 
by the documents and written notations men-
tioned, constituted valid, enforceable promises 
to pay the amounts evidenced by the invoices 
mentioned. We think such conclusion is sup-
ported by basic principals touching contracts, 
irrespective and independent of Section 70A-
5-102, Uniform Commercial Code, but none-
theless in harmony with its provisions and com-
pliance therewith." 
Not only is this a misstatement of the law of contracts, 
it is also a misstatement of UCC law. 
The third letter of credit clearly required presenta-
tion of drafts. Neither general contract law or the law 
under the UCC, would find that Valley Bank's obliga-
tion to pay arose under these circumstances. Under 
General Contract Law, the terms of a contract must 
be strictly adhered to unless the terms are altered. In 
our case, the contract terms, as set out in the third letter 
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of credit, were never altered. UCC law, as previously 
discussed, also requires strict compliance. 
3C- CONCLUSION 
A Court of last resort should jealously guard the 
record and carefully report facts. Intellectual integrity 
requires that the facts reported in a non-appealable 
decision be sustained by the evidence. Although, this 
Court can change the law or interpretation thereof, it 
must not change facts or carelessly report the same, or 
the integrity of the system of law is lost. In addition 
to incorrectly stating the facts, we believe the Court has 
also incorrectly applied the law involved in this case. 
Whether the Supreme Court based its decision upon 
general contract law or upon UCC law, the decision 
cannot be upheld. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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